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Abstract: - In recent studies on Complex Systems and Systems-of-Systems theory, a huge effort has been put to 
cope with behavioral problems, i.e. the possibility of controlling a desired overall or end-to-end behavior by 
acting on the individual elements that constitute the system itself. This problem is particularly important in the 
“SMART” environments, where the huge number of devices, their significant computational capabilities as 
well as their tight interconnection produce a complex architecture for which it is difficult to predict (and 
control) a desired behavior; furthermore, if the scenario is allowed to dynamically evolve through the 
modification of both topology and subsystems composition, then the control problem becomes a real challenge. 
In this perspective, the purpose of this paper is to cope with a specific class of control problems in complex 
systems, the “composability of security functionalities”, recently introduced by the European Funded research 
through the pSHIELD and nSHIELD projects (ARTEMIS-JU programme). In a nutshell, the objective of this 
research is to define a control framework that, given a target security level for a specific application scenario, is 
able to i) discover the system elements, ii) quantify the security level of each element as well as its contribution 
to the security of the overall system, and iii) compute the control action to be applied on such elements to reach 
the security target. The main innovations proposed by the authors are: i) the definition of a comprehensive 
methodology to quantify the security of a generic system independently from the technology and the 
environment and ii) the integration of the derived metrics into a closed-loop scheme that allows real-time 
control of the system.  
The solution described in this work moves from the proof-of-concepts performed in the early phase of the 
pSHIELD research and enriches it through an innovative metric with a sound foundation, able to potentially 
cope with any kind of application scenarios (railways, automotive, manufacturing, …). 
 
Key-Words: - Complex Systems, Closed-loop, Dynamic Composability, E2E Security, Common Criteria, 
Attack surface metrics, Optimization 
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1 Introduction 
Technological advances in computational 
capabilities along with improvement in 
communication technologies have enriched the 
market with a new class of SMART devices that can 
be used in every application domain, ranging from 
networking ([1]-[12]), automotive ([13]), 
multimedia ([14]-[16]), energy ([17]-[20]) or critical 
infrastructures protection ([21]-[23]). 
These devices (i.e. sensor nodes, SMART 
actuators, programmable controllers, small 
computing platform, etc.) are commonly referred to 
as Embedded Devices or Embedded Systems (ESs) 
and their peculiarities are: i) a reduced size, ii) the 
possibility of implementing specific functionalities 
with limited resources and iii) the possibility of 
interconnecting with other devices to create more 
complex systems. 
Leveraging these peculiarities, several industrial 
domains have started to massively deploy ESs 
networks to realize a plenty of tasks, no longer 
limited to a specific functionality but extended up to 
end-to-end behaviors.  
In order to drive the European research towards 
an improvement of ES technologies, the European 
Commission, within the Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7) has established the ARTEMIS-
JU, a technological initiative in charge of defining 
and promoting a specific roadmap towards clear and 
focused objectives [24]. One of these objectives is 
the development of new technologies and/or 
strategies to address E2E Security in the context of 
ESs, with particular care to: 
- Solutions oriented to systems certification, 
- Cost reduction 
- Re-use and re-engineering of non-recurring 
solutions. 
In this context the authors, starting from their 
academic and industrial backgrounds, have 
conceived the SHIELD Framework ([25], [26]), an 
architectural paradigm and design methodology able 
to address security aspects potentially in each and 
every domain where ESs (or networks of 
interconnected ESs) are deployed to provide specific 
services.  
As it happens for communication networks, 
where modular and cognitive architecture are 
adopted to provide flexible E2E services that 
dynamically satisfy the desired level of QoS (see 
[27]), similarly the interconnection of ESs may 
require the adoption of a modular and cognitive 
approach to provide E2E security functionalities that 
dynamically satisfy the desired “security level” form 
the end-user.  
Thus, the main novelty of the presented approach 
is the possibility of realizing a “known and 
predictable” E2E security behaviour starting from 
the composition of individual, atomic elements. In 
spite of this, the main features of the proposed 
SHIELD framework are:  
- modularity & expandability (i.e. the possibility 
of composing elements together),  
- cognitiveness & flexibility (i.e. the possibility of 
dynamically adapting to the specific context) 
- technology independence (i.e. the possibility of 
abstracting the controlled components in order to 
measure and provide security in any 
environment). 
The composition problem for complex systems’ 
control is not new in scientific landscape (see for 
example [29]), as well as the study of the security 
reliability properties of interconnected systems 
([39], [42]) but what makes this problem really 
innovative in the application field chosen for this 
paper is that: i) the authors address the problem of 
controlling a property, i.e. security, that is not 
directly measurable in a deterministic way, so an 
hybrid qualitative/ quantitative approach is needed, 
and ii) the authors derive a technology-independent 
control scheme that can be tailored and applied on 
potentially any scenario. 
The basic approach has already been presented in 
[25] as preliminary result of the pSHIELD research 
project [29]); in this paper an improvement with 
respect to the basic approach is shown, mainly 
basing on the recent advances achieved in the 
execution of the nSHIELD project ([30]), which 
represents the second phase of the SHIELD 
Roadmap. In particular this paper is the extended 
version of [31], describing more in detail the 
theoretical foundation of the new metric approach. 
In order to describe the SHIELD approach to 
E2E security, the rest of the paper is structured as 
follows: in Section 2 the SHIELD methodology (as 
presented in [25]) is recalled and in Section 3 the 
SHIELD behaviour as a closed-loop control system 
is depicted in detail. In Section 4 the metric 
approach to measure E2E security is then presented 
in detail, and in Section 5 an example is provided. 
Finally in Section 6 some considerations on 
practical scheme implementation are reported, while 
in Section 7 conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
2 The SHIELD methodology 
The main purpose of the SHIELD methodology is to 
provide an architectural solution and a design 
paradigm to enable the Composability of atomic 
(Security) functionalities in Complex Systems. 
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Fig. 1 SHIELD Methodology 
A trivial representation is provided in Fig. 1. The 
SHIELD modules can be represented as pieces of a 
puzzle, which perfectly fits each other thanks to 
common interfaces. Each module implements a 
Security technology or a specific Security 
functionality. As an example, in Fig. 1 at node level 
there are two modules: Trusted Platform Module 
and Crypto Technology, at network level there are 
two functionalities: self-x algorithms and secure 
routing, and at middleware level there are two other 
services: semantic management and authentication. 
These modules, belonging to different layers 
(node, network or middleware), can be composed 
(i.e. activated, deactivated or configured) statically 
or dynamically by the SHIELD Security Agent, an 
innovative software agent (see [1] for details) that 
collects the information on the system and takes 
decisions according to proper control algorithms. 
This is possible thanks to the development of 
proper semantic models (as outlined in [32] and 
[33]) that allow the system description in a 
technology independent way (i.e. machine readable) 
as well as the definition of security metrics that 
allow the quantification of the security level. 
 
Fig. 2 SHIELD Architecture 
Then, thanks to the continuous monitoring 
performed by the Security Agent, individual 
SHIELD modules can be dynamically activated and 
reconfigured once the measured Security metrics do 
not satisfy the required Security levels, even at run-
time.  
In addition modularity and technology-
independence of the architecture allow a plug&play-
like behaviour, suitable for any kind of application. 
In a more structured representation, in Fig. 2 the 
SHIELD reference architecture is depicted as a 
control scheme, with the indication of the actors 
involved in the measurements and commands 
exchange. The scheme is generically referred to as 
SPD functionalities, that means Security Privacy 
and Dependability, since the proposed approach 
allows to jointly address these peculiarities. 
However in the prosecution of the paper we will 
refer only to the “Security” aspects, for which the 
new metrics and the control algorithms are tailored. 
The core of the system, as previously introduced, 
is the Security Agent: each Agent monitors a set of 
properly selected measurements and parameters 
taken from the system (see the arrows labelled as 
measurements in Fig.2). These heterogeneous 
measurements and parameters are converted by the 
security agents in homogeneous/technology-
independent) metadata by extensively using 
properly selected semantic technologies; the use of 
homogeneous metadata makes easy the metadata 
exchange among different security agent (see Fig.2). 
Each Security Agent, thanks to metadata 
homogeneity, can aggregate the available metadata, 
in order to deduce information which form the so-
called dynamic context on which the control 
decisions will be tailored. 
Last, but not least, in the security agent runs a set 
of control algorithms which are responsible of 
dynamically deciding which Security modules have 
to be composed (i.e. enabled/ disabled/configured) 
in order to achieve the desired Security level. The 
decision is driven by the computation of proper 
technology independent metrics, specifically 
designed for security applications. 
In the scope of control of security functionalities, 
that is the focus subject of this paper, the strength of 
the SHIELD methodology is that is possible to 
derive an overall (i.e. end-to-end) behaviour starting 
from the atomic behaviours of atomic components 
by composing them according to rules and control 
algorithms.
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Fig. 3 Composability: a closed-loop view 
 
On a practical point of view, the SHIELD paradigm 
allows to deploy small devices (or to use the ones 
already available), interconnect them and, with the 
introduction of an intelligent software Agent, 
dynamically organizing and structuring them so that 
their capabilities are leveraged to jointly produce the 
desired effect. As an example, one may be interested 
in realising the secure monitoring of a train station:  
IF the devices deployed in the station (i.e. 
sensors, cameras, controllers, actuators, etc.) are 
SHIELD compliant  
AND IF at least one SHIELD Security Agent is 
introduced in this system 
THEN it is possible to activate the automatic 
composition and the system will automatically 
discover the available devices and the context 
information, quantify the security level according to 
the defined metrics, compute a control action and 
enforce it in the systems to activate/configure the 
sensors and cameras in the station so that the 
collected monitoring data are cyphered and made 
available only to authorized personnel.  
This is a trivial example, but it is still 
representative of what is intended for E2E security 
behaviour: each component is in charge of a specific 
functionality that is useful to reach the overall 
objective. 
 
 
3 The SHIELD closed-loop control 
approach 
The problem of composing security functionalities 
can be successfully modelled by leveraging a 
control theoretic approach and deriving a closed-
loop control scheme (see Fig.3). Indeed, such kind 
of model is by far closer to the effective 
implementation of the SHIELD system. 
The reference signal is the desired security level, 
obtained and quantified according to the SHIELD 
metrics (that will be presented in the following 
section). 
This signal is then used by the Controller, that is 
able to elaborate decision according to proper 
control algorithms as well as through the interaction 
with a secondary Context Controller that translates 
ancillary information on the system into constraints 
and parameters relevant for security purposes. A 
secondary reference signal may be applied to the 
system, if, apart from the E2E security behaviour, it 
is also of importance to control other parameters not 
relevant for security. 
In [25] a control algorithm based on Common 
Criteria composition engine enriched with Hybrid 
Automata and Model Predictive Control 
optimization have been proposed as preliminary 
instantiation of such architecture. This approach has 
been conceived to be fully in line with the concepts 
being developed in similar context (e.g. the Future 
Internet framework [34], [35]) where the limitations 
coming from the lack of coordination among 
elements belonging to different layers and/or 
heterogeneous environments, are addressed through 
the design of modular controllers and multi-
objective procedures. 
This solution proved to be valid, but less 
effective for complex implementations mainly due 
to the effort needed to translate the “information” 
into semantic models. The nSHIELD research has 
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then lead to the definition of a new, simpler and 
more efficient approach, based on these pillars: 
- A new metric has been introduced, based on the 
concept of “attack-surface”, that enables an ease 
abstraction with respect to the underlying 
technologies. 
- The Common Criteria (CC) guidelines have been 
confirmed, since the satisfaction of security 
properties must base its foundations on a 
consolidated standard, and embedded in the new 
metrics 
- The control algorithm has become the translation 
of the metrics into an optimization problem, 
whose objective is to find the elements that 
maximize a target function 
 
 
4 Metric approach to measure E2E 
security 
 
In this section the authors introduce the basic SotA 
theory by which the SHIELD metric moves. This 
approach is entirely based on the Open Source 
Security Testing Methodology ([36]) OSSTMM 
which is a scientific methodology for the accurate 
characterization of “Operational Security” (OpSec) 
through examination and correlation of test results 
in a consistent and reliable way, and the Attack 
Surface metrics concept for software architecture 
([38]). These theories are merged together to 
provide a solid basement and starting point for the 
paper’s purposes. Then, this approach is improved 
through the application to non-software 
environments and enriched with procedural/ 
quantitative assessment derived from the Common 
Criteria evaluation methodology [20]. The main 
motivation is that approaching a security 
environment requires in any case to rely on 
consolidated standards, procedures or technologies 
as basic building blocks; the innovative contribution 
hereby presented is indeed given by the choice of 
these building blocks as well as their refinement to 
cope with context different from the software 
domain. 
The result of this analysis-synthesis work is a 
metric that provides a self-consistent mean to 
translate “security properties” into a cardinal 
number that can be used to quantify the exposure of 
a system to threats; this number can be used to 
provide an intelligent controller (e.g. in a closed-
loop scheme) with a reference signal that can be 
used to take decisions.  
 
 
4.1 Attack-surface and OSSTMM metric 
Since this paper merges two reference 
methodologies, some of the text addressing the basic 
definition and procedural steps in this section is 
entirely taken from the reference work [36] and 
[38]; changing the taxonomy would have indeed 
introduced mismatching in the methodology 
understanding to the reader. 
To define the metric, we start with a basic 
statement: “security measurement  necessarily 
moves from the identification of what can cause 
damage to the system and to its dependability”. 
Typically, what causes damage is the “threat”. 
In fact by adopting a definition that integrates 
security and dependability concepts, one can assert 
that: “A threat can be seen as the origin of the fault 
chain (fault->errors->failures-> damages) for the 
dependability concerns and as the potential for 
abuse of protected assets by the system for security 
concerns”. In this perspective, an attacker is the 
threat agent and it can be either a malicious human 
activity or a non-malicious event. How can the 
attacker affect the system? The answer is “through 
interactions”: in fact the attacker uses the system’s 
entry and exit points (i.e. its interfaces) to attack the 
system, so the identification of security threats 
basically involves identifying and controlling 
system’s interfaces, being them internal or external. 
The definition of the “attack-surface” is then 
given, as stated in [38] “[…] intuitively, the attack 
surface of a system is the set of ways in which an 
adversary can enter the system and potentially 
cause damage […]”. In fact, according to the 
OSSTMM methodology, as first step of the metric 
computation procedure, an “entry and exit point 
framework” must be identified to perform security 
assessment and this entry and exit point framework 
can be assimilated to the “attack surface” that a 
system exposed to the external world.  
On a practical point of view, this surface can be 
intended as a “virtual line” that surrounds a system 
and by which is possible to identify the potential 
menaces or vulnerabilities that affect the security 
level, i.e. its interfaces. The surface may 
dynamically evolve, so when new elements are 
inserted, removed or merged into the system, the 
attack surface is updated consequently and the new 
menaces/vulnerabilities are updated as well. Once 
the final shape of the system is achieved, the surface 
is frozen as the starting point to perform control. 
Potential control strategies that must be put in place 
to increase the security of the system should aim at 
reducing the attack surface, since it is reasonable 
that, as stated in [38] “[…]the “smaller” is the 
attack surface, the more the system is secure[…]” 
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To translate the surface into a manageable 
number, some numerical factors must be taken into 
account.  
The first factor is the porosity, i.e. the grade of 
separation between the system and the attacker. 
Porosity is a function of three parameters: 
- The “complexity”, i.e. the number of 
components critical for the security, privacy and 
dependability of the system, which failure might 
not be tolerated by system architecture or another 
system within the scope. This positive integer 
value is indicated as PC 
- The “trust” level, i.e. the quantification of each 
relationship that exists where the system accepts 
interaction freely from its component. This 
positive integer value is indicated as  PT. 
- The “access”, i.e. the number of different places 
where the interaction (from outside the 
component/system) can occur. This positive 
integer value is indicated as PA. 
 
However, not all the “pores” identified through 
this last parameter are similar. For each access pore 
identified, it's necessary to introduce the concept of 
damage potential-effort ratio (DER) (as defined in 
[38]) to have a consistent measure of the lack of 
separation that introduces. DER is the ratio between 
the “Damage Potential” and the “Effort” values for 
each interface (1), and provides a numerical 
indicator of the damage that can be caused to the 
system if a malicious access occurs through the 
selected pore.  
In fact the access pores don’t contribute equally 
to system’s porosity measurement because not all 
access pores are equally likely to be used by an 
attacker. A pore’s contribution to a system’s attack 
surface depends on the access pore’s damage 
potential, i.e., the level of harm the attacker can 
cause to the system by using the access pore in an 
attack and the effort the attacker spends to acquire 
the necessary access rights in order to be able to use 
it in an attack. The higher the damage potential or 
the lower the effort, the higher access pore’s 
contribution to the porosity, as indicated by the 
following formula: 
DPEi =
DPi
DEi
     ∀i ∈ set of access  (1) 
 
We consider damage potential and effort in 
isolation while estimating a resource’s contribution 
to the attack surface [38]. From an attacker’s point 
of view, however, damage potential and effort are 
related; if the attacker gains higher privilege by 
using a method in an attack, then the attacker also 
gains the access rights of a larger set of methods. 
For example, the attacker can access only the 
methods with authenticated user access rights by 
gaining authenticated privilege, whereas the attacker 
can access methods with authenticated user and root 
access rights by gaining root privilege. The attacker 
might be willing to spend more effort to gain a 
higher privilege level that then enables the attacker 
to cause damage as well as gain more access rights. 
Hence we consider damage potential and effort in 
tandem and quantify a resource’s contribution as a 
damage potential effort ratio. The ratio is similar to 
a cost-benefit ratio; the damage potential is the 
benefit to the attacker in using a resource in an 
attack and the effort is the cost to the attacker in 
using the resource. 
Porosity access can then be further defined by 
the following formula:  
PA = ∑ DPEi ∀i ∈ set of accessi   (2) 
 
Note that PA is a natural number, so the value 
obtained by the previous formula is rounded to the 
nearest integer number (and it cannot assume 
negative values). 
Then, starting from the above mentioned three 
basic values, the OSSTMM provides a numerical 
indicator to summarize the porosity value, named 
Operation Security (OpSec), that has been used in 
nSHIELD approach and is given by: 
 
OpSec𝑠𝑢𝑚 = 𝑎PC + 𝑏PA + 𝑐 PT  (3) 
Where a, b and c are may assume values in the 
interval [0; 1] to weight the individual contribution, 
according to environmental conditions of the 
system. OpSec𝑠𝑢𝑚 is a positive integer number so, 
as for PA computation, the value obtained by the 
previous formula is rounded to the nearest integer 
number. This value can be expressed also in a 
normalized logarithmic form OpSecsumb, as seen in 
the following. 
The second factor to be considered in the 
OSSTMM metrics is the control. 
Controls are a means to influence the impact of 
threats and their effects when interaction is required: 
they are, in a nutshell, the mean by which we can 
reduce the porosity of the system. 
For the purposes of the SHIELD metrics, among all 
the possible controls, only ten controls categories 
have been selected from [36] as applicable. Controls 
categories can be grouped in two clusters. 
The first cluster are the “Interactive Controls”, 
i.e. those controls that directly influence complexity, 
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access, or trust interactions. They are (according to 
the official definitions in [36]) as follows: 
- Authentication is a control through the challenge 
of credentials based on identification and 
authorization. 
- Indemnification is a control through a contract 
between the asset owner and the interacting 
party. This contract may be in the form of a 
visible warning as a precursor to legal action if 
posted rules are not followed, specific, public 
legislative protection, or with a third-party 
assurance provider in case of damages like an 
insurance company. 
- Resilience is a control over all interactions to 
maintain the protection of assets in the event of 
corruption or failure. 
- Subjugation is a control assuring that interactions 
occur only according to defined processes. The 
asset owner defines how the interaction occurs 
which removes the freedom of choice but also 
the liability of loss from the interacting party. 
- Continuity is a control over all interactions to 
maintain interactivity with assets in the event of 
corruption or failure. 
The second cluster includes “Process Controls”, i.e. 
those controls which are used to create defensive 
processes. These controls do not directly influence 
interactions rather they protect the assets once the 
threat is present. They are (according to the official 
definitions in [36]) as follows: 
- Non-repudiation is a control which prevents the 
interacting party from denying its role in any 
interactivity. 
- Confidentiality is a control for assuring an asset 
displayed or exchanged between interacting 
parties cannot be known outside of those parties. 
- Privacy is a control for assuring the means of 
how an asset is accessed, displayed, or 
exchanged between parties cannot be known 
outside of those parties. 
- Integrity is a control to assure that interacting 
parties know when assets and processes have 
changed. 
- Alarm is a control to notify that an interaction is 
occurring or has occurred.  
 
Three variables can be used to quantify the controls’ 
effect:  
- LC, i.e. Loss Control, that provides an indication 
of the Controls currently active/implemented in 
the system. In order to avoid disproportionate 
contributions of controls, the standard foresees 
the possibility of smoothing this value by means 
of logarithmic transformation, as follows. The 
normalized value is named FC (Full Control):  
FC = log2(1 + 10 ∙ LC)   (4) 
- MC, i.e. Missing Control, that represents the 
number of controls required to reach the 
balancing between the OpSec and the controls 
and is given by the following formula: 
𝑀𝐶 = {
0        𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑢𝑚 − 𝐿𝐶 ≤ = 0 
OpSecsum − LC           𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (5) 
- TC, i.e. True Control, that, in opposition to the 
Missing Controls, is used to measure the ideal 
placement of controls according to the formula: 
TC = OpSecsum − MC   (6) 
In order to avoid disproportionate placement of 
controls, the standard foresees the possibility of 
normalizing this value by means of logarithmic 
transformation, as follows:  
TCb = log
2(1 + 100(OpSecsum − MC ∙ 0.1)) (7) 
Another useful instrument is the True Coverage 
(TCvg), expressing percentage ratio between 
controls and OpSec.  
𝑇𝐶𝑣𝑔 = {
0                   𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑠𝑢𝑚 ≤ = 0 
1 −
MCsum
10∙OpSecsum
           𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  (8) 
As previously seen, True Control and Missing 
Control play a complementary role: it is easy to 
understand the Missing Coverage (MCvg). 
MCvg = 1 − TCvg =
MCsum
10∙OpSecsum
  (9) 
The third and last factor in the overall metric 
definition is the limitation, that represents the 
incapacity of protection mechanisms to work 
properly; in other words it represents the holes, 
vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and any problem in 
keeping that separation between an asset and a 
threat or in assuring controls continue working 
correctly. The five Limitation classifications are 
(according to the official definitions in [36]) as 
follows: 
- Vulnerability is the flaw or error that: (a) denies 
access to assets for authorized people or 
processes, (b) allows for privileged access to 
assets to unauthorized people or processes, or (c) 
allows unauthorized people or processes to hide 
assets or themselves within a defined scenario. 
This value can be indicated by LV and must be 
weighted by a value that takes into account the 
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missing controls (that leads to vulnerability) as 
follows: 
WLV =
OpSecsum+MCsum
OpSecsum
             (10) 
- Weakness is the flaw or error that disrupts, 
reduces, abuses, or nullifies specifically the 
effects of the five interactivity controls: 
authentication, indemnification, resilience, 
subjugation, and continuity. 
This value can be indicated by LW and must be 
weighted by a value that takes into account the 
missing Class A controls as follows: 
WLW =
OpSecsum+MCA
OpSecsum
              (11) 
- Concern is the flaw or error that disrupts, 
reduces, abuses, or nullifies the effects of the 
flow or execution of the five process controls: 
non-repudiation, confidentiality, privacy, 
integrity, and alarm. 
This value can be indicated by LC and must be 
weighted by a value that takes into account the 
missing Class B controls as follows: 
WL𝐶 =
OpSecsum+MCB
OpSecsum
              (12) 
- Exposure is an unjustifiable action, flaw, or error 
that provides direct or indirect visibility of 
critical assets for the security, privacy and 
dependability of the nSHIELD system within the 
chosen scenario interface. 
This value can be indicated by LE and must be 
weighted by a factor that takes into account 
complexity, accesses (scaled by the coverage 
percentage) plus the value of the limitation 
introduced by the other controls, as follows: 
WLE =
(PV+PA)∙MCvg+LV+LW+LC
OpSecsum
             (13) 
- Anomaly is any unidentifiable or unknown 
element which has not been controlled and 
cannot be accounted for in normal operations. 
This value is indicated by LA and is weighted by 
a factor that takes into account the trust values 
(i.e. major source of unforeseen anomalies) as 
well as the limitation introduces so far, according 
to the following formula: 
WLA =
PT∙MCvg+LV+LW+LC
OpSecsum
              (14) 
The aggregated total limitation of the system is 
simply given by the weighted sum of these values. 
As previously seen, the evaluation can lead to two 
parameters: the first is an algebraic sum and the 
second is a base (logarithmic) form. 
SecLimsum = LV ∙ WLV + LW ∙ WLW+ 
        +LC ∙ WLC+LE ∙ WLE + LA ∙ WLA   (15) 
SecLimb = log
2(1 + 100 ∙ SecLimsum)       (16) 
Controls and Limitations usually leads to a 
compromise. While controls are a positive influence 
in each possible SHIELD scenario, minimizing the 
attack surface, they can themselves add to the attack 
surface if they themselves have limitations. Often 
this effect is not noticed and if the protection 
mechanisms aren’t tested thoroughly as to how they 
work under all conditions, this may not become 
evident. Therefore the use of controls must assure 
that they do not insinuate new attack interfaces into 
the target. Therefore, sometimes no controls is 
better than bad controls. 
Fig. 4 shows how the Limitations are mapped with 
respect to the system and the controls. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Limitations effects 
 
Finally, all these values can be put together to 
provide a quantification of the overall “security 
level” of the system (namely SEC). Each elementary 
value can be computed simply by counting the 
number of occurrences within the system (i.e. the 
number of limitation, the number of controls, …) 
while the other parameters are obtained through the 
presented formulas.  
The first term to compute the final security value 
associated to the system is the SEC level Δ. 
ΔSEC = FCb − OpSecb − SecLimb                (17) 
The second term, namely True Protection is useful 
to understand the relationship among Porosity, True 
Control and Security Limitation. 
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TruPro = 100 + TCb − OpSecb − SecLimb     (18) 
The Actual SEC level is given by: 
 
SEC = 100 + ΔSEC + 
       −
1
100
∙ (OpSecbFCb − OpSecbSecLimb + 
                                                          +FCbSecLimb) (19) 
 
All the used values can be collected by a simple 
assessment of the system and/or be available in a 
system DB, thus making the security computation 
easy and at least semi-automatic. 
As a conclusion, in [36] it has demonstrated that a 
system’s attack surface measurement requires only 
the knowledge and computation of the system’s 
factors porosity, controls, and limitation. 
This represents the core of the SHIELD metric, 
improved with a Common Criteria methodology 
Injection. 
 
4.2 Metric improvement by means of 
Common Criteria 
 
Starting from what has been described in Section 
4.1, the innovation brought by the authors and 
derived from the Common Criteria ([20]) is that the 
contribution provided by the limitations to the attack 
surface may vary from limitation to limitation and 
from one context to another, according to specific 
technological and environmental considerations. 
This lead to the introduction of a function able to 
reflect such differences and quantify the impact of a 
limitation: this is done through the concept of 
“Attack Potential” described in the Common 
Criteria standard [20]. Attack potential is a function 
of expertise, resources and motivation. There are 
multiple methods for representing and quantifying 
these factors. 
Motivation is an attack potential factor that 
describes several aspects related to the attacker and 
the assets the attacker desires to damage. At first, 
motivation can imply the likelihood of an attack 
(e.g. an attacker described as highly motivated 
means that an attack is imminent, or alternatively no 
attack is anticipated from an un-motivated attacker). 
However, except for the two extreme levels of 
motivation, it is difficult to derive a probability of 
an attack occurring from motivation. 
Secondly, motivation can imply the value of the 
asset, monetarily or otherwise, either to the attacker 
or the asset holder. An asset of very high value is 
more likely to motivate an attack compared to an 
asset of little value. However, it is difficult to relate 
asset value to motivation because the value of an 
asset is subjective and it depends largely upon the 
value an asset holder places on it. 
Last, but not least, motivation can imply the 
expertise and resources by which an attacker is 
willing to effect an attack. One can infer that a 
highly motivated attacker is likely to acquire 
sufficient expertise and resources to defeat the 
measures protecting an asset. Conversely, one can 
infer that an attacker with significant expertise and 
resources is not willing to effect an attack using 
them if the attacker's motivation is low. 
Considering the second aspect, an asset holder 
may believe that the value of the assets (however 
measured) is sufficient to motivate attack against 
them. The attacker's motivation is considered to 
determine the methods of attack that may be 
attempted, as well as the expertise and resources 
used in those attacks. 
Expertise and resources reflect the tools used by 
the attacker to perform the attack. Tab. 1 identifies 
the factors used to compute the Attack Potential and 
the associated numeric values with the total value of 
each factor. 
Where a factor falls close to the boundary of a 
range the analyst should consider use of an 
intermediate value to those in the table. For 
example, if twenty samples are required to perform 
the attack then a value between one and four may be 
selected for that factor, or if the design is based on a 
publicly available design but the developer has 
made some alterations then a value between zero 
and three should be selected according to the 
analyst's view of the impact of those design 
changes. The table is intended as a guide. 
 
Factor  Value  Factor Value 
Elapsed Time 
 Knowledge of Target of 
the attack 
<= one day  0  Public 0 
<= one week  1  Restricted 3 
<= two weeks  2  Sensitive 7 
<= one month  4  Critical 11 
<= two months  7  Window of Opportunity 
<= three 
months 
10 
 Unnecessary/ 
unlimited access 
0 
<= four months 13  Easy 1 
<= five months 15  Moderate 4 
<= six months 17  Difficult 10 
> six months 19  None ** 
Expertise  Equipment 
Layman 0  Standard 0 
Proficient 3  Specialized 4 
Expert 6  Bespoke 7 
Multiple 
experts 
8 
 
Multiple bespoke 9 
Tab. 1 Attack Potential Computation parameters 
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The “**” specification in the table in considering 
Window of Opportunity is not to be seen as a 
natural progression from the timescales specified in 
the preceding ranges associated with this factor. 
This specification identifies that for a particular 
reason the potential vulnerability cannot be 
exploited in the target of the attack in its intended 
operational environment. For example, access to the 
target of the attack may be detected after a certain 
amount of time in a known environment (i.e. in the 
case of a system) where regular patrols are 
completed, and the attacker could not gain access to 
the target of the attack for the required two weeks 
undetected. However, this would not be applicable 
to a target connected to the network where remote 
access is possible, or where the physical 
environment of the target of the attack is unknown. 
In order to determine the resistance of the target 
of the attack to the identified potential 
vulnerabilities, the following steps shall be applied: 
a) Define the possible attack scenarios {AS1, 
AS2... ASn} for the target of the attack in 
the operational environment. 
b) For each attack scenario, perform a 
theoretical analysis and calculate the 
relevant attack potential using Tab. 1. 
c) For each attack scenario, if necessary, 
perform penetration tests in order to confirm 
or to disprove the theoretical analysis. 
The “Values” column of Tab. 2 indicates the 
range of attack potential values (calculated using 
Tab. 1) of an attack scenario that results in the SPD 
functionalities being undermined. 
 
Values 
Attack potential 
required to exploit 
scenario 
Target resistant to 
attackers with attack 
potential of 
0-9 Basic No rating 
10-13 Enhanced-Basic Basic 
14-19 Moderate Enhanced-Basic 
20-24 High Moderate 
=>25 Beyond High High 
Tab. 2 Rating of vulnerabilities and attacked 
target resistance 
Such kind of approach cannot take into account each 
and every circumstance or factor, but should give a 
better indication of the level of resistance to attack 
required to achieve the standard ratings. Other 
factors, such as the reliance on unlikely chance 
occurrences, are not included in the basic model but 
can be used by an analyst as justification for a rating 
other than those that the basic model might indicate. 
It should be noted that whereas a number of 
vulnerabilities rated individually may indicate high 
resistance to attack, collectively the combination of 
vulnerabilities may indicate that overall a lower 
rating is applicable. The presence of one 
vulnerability may make another easier to exploit. 
In the SPD level computation, the value assigned 
to vulnerabilities is calculated by performing a 
weighted sum of all identified vulnerabilities 
categorized according to the Tab. 2. The weight for 
each category of vulnerability (basic, enhanced 
basic, moderate, high and beyond high) is assigned 
by constant values (empirical parameters derived 
from experience) that are characterized by being 
inversely proportional to the attack potential 
required to exploit the scenario; this is because the 
lower the attack potential required to exploit the 
scenario the greater the impact of the vulnerability 
and then the attack surface on which is based the 
whole theory. For further reference on this 
computation approach, please refers to SHIELD 
project’s documents ([45]).  
 
4.3 Metric Composition rules 
 
Another key innovation of the SHIELD metrics is 
their scalability with respect to the number of 
systems’ elements. In fact the metric computation is 
easy and can be applied to individual components as 
well as to group of components in the same way, by 
simply applying some basic composition rules.  
More in detail: 
- Step 1: starting on system architecture, it is 
necessary to define by successive steps how 
all the various components involved in the 
overall computation are physically connected 
to create complex elements and/or sub-
systems. The output is coupling sequence (for 
example if there are five elements A, B, C, D 
and E, the result may be A is connected with 
B, C is connected with D and E, so the final 
coupling sequence will be (AUB)U(CUDUE)). 
- Step 2: following the coupling sequence, the 
basic parameters for metric computation 
(equations from (1) to (16)) must be put 
together by composing the corresponding 
values (for example the complexity values of 
two components is summed, the number of 
controls is summed for each and every 
category, and so on). Composition rules are 
reported in the following  
- Step 3: finally the Actual Security Level 
(equations from (17) to (19)) is computed 
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only once, at the end of the procedure, on the 
basis of the parameters derived in Step 2. 
The rules of metrics composition used to couple 
basic parameters are as follows: 
 Complexity (SUM) 
All critical elements whose failure might not be 
tolerated by system architecture must be 
considered. (If the same element is critical for 
more than one component it must be considered 
only once; if a single component has more than 
one critical element, it must be considered as 1 
in the composition) 
 Access (SUM for the different types) 
All possible accesses to the composition of 
components must be considered. (If one access 
is common to both components, it must be 
considered as 1; if one access of the first 
component belongs also to the other component 
and is internal to the composition of 
components (with a relationship of trust) then 
these accesses must not be considered and must 
be augmented of one unit the Trust element) 
 Trust (SUM) 
Each relation that exists wherever the system 
accepts interaction freely from its component 
or another system within the scope, must be 
considered.  
 Confidentiality, Privacy, Authentication, 
Resilience, Integrity, Non-repudiation, 
Subjugation, Continuity, Indemnification, 
Alarm (SUM for the different categories) 
All controls that counteract threats and their 
effects must be considered. 
 Exposure (SUM) 
All unjustifiable action, flaw, or error that 
provides direct or indirect visibility of targets 
or assets within the chosen scenario interface 
must be considered. (If the same element 
represent an exposure  for more than one 
component it must be considered only once) 
 Vulnerability (SUM for the different rating) 
All possible flaw or error that: (a) denies access 
to assets for authorized people or processes, (b) 
allows for privileged access to assets to 
unauthorized people or processes, or (c) allows 
unauthorized people or processes to hide assets 
or themselves within the scope, must be 
considered. 
 Weakness (SUM for the different types) 
All possible flaws or errors that disrupts, 
reduces, abuses, or nullifies specifically the 
effects of the five interactivity controls: 
authentication, indemnification, resilience, 
subjugation, and continuity must be considered. 
 Concern (SUM) 
All possible flaws or errors that disrupts, 
reduces, abuses, or nullifies the effects of the 
flow or execution of the five process controls: 
non-repudiation, confidentiality, privacy, 
integrity, and alarm, must be considered 
 Anomaly (SUM) 
All unidentifiable or unknown elements which 
cannot be accounted for in normal operations, 
generally when the source or destination of the 
element cannot be understood, must be 
considered. (If more than one component 
considers the same anomaly it must be counted 
only once) 
The final procedure to compute SPD level for a 
generic complex system, starting from its individual 
components, is reported in Fig. 5 and represents one 
of the SHIELD projects breakthrough. 
 
Fig. 6 Metrics Computation procedure 
Complexity Value
Computation
Access Value
Computation
Trust Value
Computation
Complexity Value
Computation
Access Value
Computation
Trust Value
Computation
Controls Value 
Computation
Limitation Value 
Computation
(including Attack 
Potential weight)
Component 1 Component n
…
Controls Value 
Computation
Components and parameters’ values Coupling
(according to composition rules)
Computation of Actual SEC level (SEC)
Computation of Operation Security
Computation of True Coverage (TCvg) 
and Missing Coveraga (MCvg)
Identification of Missing Control (LC), 
True Controls (TC) and Full Controls (FC) 
Limitation Value 
Computation
(including Attack 
Potential weight)
Computation of SEC level Δ
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4.3 SHIELD closed-loop (metric-based) 
control scheme 
Once the attack surface is computed according to 
the procedure defined so far, a control algorithm can 
be put in place to use these metrics to drive the 
composability problem of security functionalities.  
 
 
Fig. 6 Innovative Controller 
 
The result is depicted in Fig. 6: 
- The Context Aware controller, relying on the 
OSSTMM standard, uses context information to 
provide the list of Interactive/Process Controls 
that the main controller may put in place to cope 
with the security needs. 
- The main controller takes the current value of the 
metric plus the set of functionalities available in 
the system and, basing on a look-up table or an 
optimization function, tries to minimize the 
vulnerability of the attack surface by activating 
functionalities and inserting “controls”. 
To make this scheme more efficient, the influence 
of a Policy Management (that in [25] has been 
modelled as a disturb) is considered and hereby 
modelled has a “controllable” input for the context 
controller, that considers Policies as constraints to 
the Interactive/Process controls to put in place. 
From a mathematical point of view, the main 
controller solves a typical optimal control problem 
(e.g. [41]) where:  
- the objective function is the minimization/ 
maximization of the Security value associated to 
a specific system configuration 
- the constraints is given by the OSSTMM-CC 
standards (and by the policy management 
system).  
- the candidate solutions are all the potential 
configurations of systems elements (or controls 
to be activated), each of them associated to a 
specific metric computed as described above.  
In a nutshell, maximizing the Security level cause 
the activation of more controls and 
countermeasures, i.e. the choice of a system 
configuration with the highest metric value. In 
particular, this is achieved by minimizing the ΔSEC 
(i.e. security) value, which is the difference between 
the desired and actual SEC values. It must be noted 
that the problem may be solve either by enumerating 
all the possible elements configuration and sorting 
them, or by building a more compact formulation 
(e.g. linear programming) and solving it by means 
of classical approaches.  
In this paper a specific formulation of the 
optimization problem is not provided, since the 
main purpose is to present the theoretical 
frameworks, as well as the innovative metric for 
security that is decoupled from the mathematical 
theory adopted to solve it; in fact other instruments, 
different from simple optimization, can be adopted, 
like for example Petri Nets ([43]):  a clear example 
of the application of Petri Nets to composable 
security is given in [44].  
This framework opens indeed the way to several 
improvements and enrichment on the “solving” part.  
 
 
5 Example of the SHIELD approach  
The example by which the proposed methodology 
has been tested is an improvement of the one 
presented in [25] as final demonstration of the 
pSHIELD project, i.e. the “Monitoring of freight 
trains transporting hazardous material”. 
The hypothesized platform is composed by a 
central unit connected by means of a ciphered 
wireless network to remote sensors. In this platform 
the assets to protect are data sent by remote sensors 
to central unit, where data are recorded inside the 
central unit itself. 
Threats identified for the above scenario are the 
following: 
- Unauthorized disclosure of information stored 
within or communicated through computers or 
communications systems; 
- Unauthorized modification or destruction of 
stored information; 
- Manipulation of computer or telecommuni-
cations services resulting in various violations; 
- Propagation of false or misleading information; 
- Users lacking guidance or security awareness; 
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- Data entry or utilization error; 
- Faulty access rights management; 
Security functionalities (i.e. Controls) that 
counteract the above mentioned threats belong to 
the following categories: 
- Authentication; 
- Confidentiality; 
- Non repudiation; 
- Subjugation. 
The application of the surface Attach metrics 
approach does not depend on a thorough knowledge 
of the theory that generates such an approach, but 
only by a well-established knowledge that the 
supplier of the system and/or components of a 
system must have on security issues. 
Starting from the previously evidenced threats, for 
each of the two components the attack surface value 
must be computed, according to the guidelines 
provided in [20] and [36].  
The values for the components of the sample 
scenario are: 
- Central unit: 88,75 (constant due to the lack of 
controls that could be implemented) 
- Wireless Sensor Network: [84,089 93,340] 
Depending on which of the two available controls is 
activated. In fact it is important to consider that the 
different choice of key management and 
Cryptographic operation algorithm change the 
vulnerability type, so it insert the possibility, 
changing these algorithm to modify the Security 
level of the component introducing different states.  
In this case the formulation of an Optimization 
function is not needed, since it is evident that the 
most robust configuration is the one associated to a 
93,340 value for the WSN. However, in case the 
available controls and their combination is very 
high, it is sufficient to maximize the Optimization 
function given by the sum of the atomic security 
value, within the constraints defined by policies (i.e. 
mutual inclusion or mutual exclusions of controls) 
 
 
6 Control scheme implementation 
In the SHIELD roadmap demonstrators ([29] and 
[30]) a sample implementation of the presented 
control architecture has been proposed and tested on 
real application scenarios. Since the SHIELD 
framework is thought to be deployed on large scale 
complex systems composed by dozens or hundreds 
of devices, it seems impossible to think about 
pervasive HW/SW injection in the system; in other 
words, such solution, to be effective, must be 
seamless deployable into an existing system, in 
order not to impact the current operational 
capabilities. This objective has been achieved in two 
ways: 
- By minimizing the number of new HW 
equipment to be put in place 
- By minimizing the SW upgrade to be applied to 
the system 
The first point is immediately addressed with the 
architectural constraints described in Section2: the 
proposed methodology in fact requires the presence 
of at least (only) one entity, named Security Agent, 
to run into the system to collect/compute metrics. 
This software entity can be installed into existing 
nodes with high computational capabilities (i.e.  no 
need of HW injection); if no powerful nodes are 
available, then (only) one new node can be inserted, 
in any system entry point. This high capability node 
is requested to run common Service Discovery 
Protocols to collect the metrics from the different 
devices: such protocols are freeware and a plenty of 
libraries have been developed for the most common 
languages. The Security Agent implements also the 
control algorithm, that can be either a look-up table 
or an optimization function, whose libraries are 
freeware as well. 
To address the second need (minimize SW 
upgrade) we can assert that no upgrade is needed in 
the rest of the system apart from the presence of a 
module able to reply to the discovery requests: this 
capability is native in most common devices, so the 
assertion in reasonable. This discovery answering 
module is indeed responsible of capturing the 
discovery requests coming from the security agent 
and answering with the list of parameters used to 
compute the metrics (as indicated in Section 4). 
Last, but not least, the key enabling technology 
that makes the system work is Ontology, i.e. a tool 
to represent information in a structured way (see 
[32] and [40] as example). A proper SHIELD 
ontology has been designed to include all the 
OSSTMM, attack surface and Common Criteria 
related parameters, to that the information exchange 
between the system’s elements is efficient and 
requires basic network connectivity. This increase 
the feasibility of SHIELD deployment over systems 
with dozens of components.  
 
 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper the innovative results achieved by the 
nSHIELD project have been presented, as a 
significant improvement of the proof of concept 
reported in [25], with additional details with respect 
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to the short version of this work ([31]). In particular 
it has been shown how it is possible to drive an E2E 
behaviour by acting on the atomic elements; the key 
idea is to describe each component with a clear and 
univocally defined metric value that measure the 
vulnerability of its attack surface (derived as a mix 
of [20], [36] and [38] guidelines). Then, while 
composing together several elements, the resulting 
attack surface is obtained as the result of an 
optimization problem whose potential solutions are 
the different controls that the atomic elements can 
put in place to countermeasure specific menaces. 
The problem may be solved by exploration or 
through simple heuristics.  
The proposed methodology is currently being 
intensively tested in industrially relevant scenarios 
from the avionic and railways domains and the 
results will be made available in the final nSHIELD 
project deliverables. 
Future works foresee the adaptation of the 
proposed approach to address also other problems. It 
could be particularly helpful, for example, in 
scenarios where the topologies change very often 
and the E2E behavior is the provisioning of a 
specific service, like power distribution (see [37]). 
The main challenge will be the adaptation/tailoring 
of a proper metric to the new domain, since a good 
metric is the basis of any SHIELD-like 
methodology. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank the pSHIELD and 
nSHIELD partners (in particular, V. Suraci for his 
valuable contributions) for the significant work 
performed in these projects to transfer the SHIELD 
methodology from idea to reality. 
An acknowledgement goes also to the authors of 
[36] and [38] for their valuable contribution to the 
state of the art with a theory that proved to be 
effective for the SHIELD needs and that has been 
entirely endorsed, and a bit refined, to fit the 
selected problem 
 
 
References: 
[1] A. Palo, L. Zuccaro, A. Simeoni, V. Suraci, L. 
Musto, P. Garino, “A common open interface 
to programmatically control and supervise open 
networks in the future internet,” in 2013 Future 
Network and Mobile Summit, pp. 1 – 9, Lisbon, 
July 2013.  ISBN: 978-190582437-3. 
[2] G. Oddi, M. Panfili, A. Pietrabissa, L. Zuccaro, 
V. Suraci, “A resource allocation algorithm of 
multi-cloud resources based on Markov 
Decision Process,” in IEEE 5th International 
Conference on Cloud Computing Technology 
and Science (CloudCom 2013), Bristol, UK, 2-
5 December, 2013, pp. 130-135, doi: 
10.1109/CloudCom.2013.24. 
[3] T. Meyer, V. Suraci, P. Langendörfer, S. 
Nowak, M. Bahr, R. Jennen, “An inter-MAC 
architecture for heterogeneous Gigabit home 
networks,” in IEEE International Symposium 
on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio 
Communications, PIMRC, pp. , vol. 5449931, 
Tokio, 2009. ISBN: 978-142445123-4. DOI: 
10.1109/PIMRC.2009.5449931 
[4] M. Castrucci, M. Cecchi, F. Delli Priscoli, L. 
Fogliati, P. Garino, V. Suraci, “Key Concepts 
for the Future Internet Architecture,” in 2011 
Future Network & Mobile Summit, Warsaw, 
June 2011. ISBN: 9781905824236. 
[5] Mignanti S, Di Giorgio A, Suraci V (2008). A 
Model Based RL Admission Control Algorithm 
for Next Generation Networks. In: AlBegain K; 
Cuevas A. Proceedings - The 2nd International 
Conference on Next Generation Mobile 
Applications, Services, and Technologies, 
NGMAST 2008. Cardiff, WALES, SEP 16-19, 
2008, ISBN: 978-0-7695-3333-9, doi: 
10.1109/NGMAST.2008.19 
[6] G. Oddi A. Pietrabissa,, F. Delli Priscoli, V. 
Suraci, "A decentralized load balancing 
algorithm for heterogeneous wireless access 
networks", in World Telecommunication 
Congress (WTC), Berlin, June 2014. 
[7] V. Suraci, V. Castrucci, G. Oddi, A. Cimmino, 
R. Colella, “Convergence in Home Gigabit 
Networks: Implementation of the Inter-MAC 
Layer as a Pluggable Kernel Module,” in 21st 
Annual IEEE International Symposium on 
Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio 
Communication, pp. 2569 – 2574, Instanbul, 
September 2010. ISBN: 978-1-4244-8017-3. 
DOI: 10.1109/PIMRC.2010.5671761. 
[8] G. Oddi, A. Pietrabissa and F. Liberati, 
"Energy balancing in multi-hop Wireless 
Sensor Networks: an approach based on 
reinforcement learning", in Proc. of 2014 
NASA/ESA Conference on Adaptive Hardware 
and Systems (AHS-2014), Leicester, UK. 
[9] G. Oddi, A. Pietrabissa, "A distributed multi-
path algorithm for wireless ad-hoc networks 
based on Wardrop routing". in Proc. of the 21st 
Mediterranean Conference on Control & 
Automation (MED), 2013 , doi: 
10.1109/MED.2013.6608833. 
[10] A. Pietrabissa, “Admission Control in UMTS 
Networks based on Approximate Dynamic 
Programming,” European Journal of Control, 
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on SYSTEMS
Andrea Fiaschetti, Andrea Lanna, Martina Panfili 
Silvano Mignanti, Antonio Pietrabissa, Francesco Delli Priscoli 
Roberto Cusani, Gaetano Scarano, Andrea Morgagni
E-ISSN: 2224-2678 200 Volume 14, 2015
vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 62-75 , January 2008, 
doi:10.3166/ejc.14.62-75. 
[11] A. Pietrabissa, “An Alternative LP Formulation 
of the Admission Control Problem in Multi-
Class Networks,” IEEE Transaction on 
Automatic Control, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 839-845, 
April 2008, doi: 10.1109/TAC.2008.919516. 
[12] A. Pietrabissa, “A Reinforcement Learning 
Approach to Call Admission and Call Dropping 
Control in Links with Variable Capacity”, 
European Journal of Control, vol. 17, no. 1, 
pp. 89-103, 2011, ISSN 0974-3580, DOI: 
10.3166/EJC.17.89-103. 
[13] A. Di Giorgio, F. Liberati, S. Canale, "IEC 
61851 compliant Electric vehicle charging 
control in Smartgrids," in 21
st
 Mediterranean 
Conference on Control and Automation 
MED13, IEEE, pp. 1329 – 1335, Chania, GR, 
June 2013. DOI: 10.1109/MED.2013.6608892. 
[14] V. Suraci, A. Palo A, “Green networking: 
Integration of Wireless Sensor Network with 
Home Gigabit Access,” in 2011 Future 
Network & Mobile Summit 2011, Warsaw, June 
2011. ISBN: 978-1-905824-16-8. 
[15] F. Delli Priscoli, "Dynamic Class of Service 
Mapping for Quality of Experience Control in 
Future Networks", in World 
Telecommunication Congress (WTC), Berlin, 
June 2014. 
[16] V. Suraci, S. Mignanti, A. Aiuto, “Context-
aware Semantic Service Discovery” in 
Proocedings of Mobile and Wireless 
Communications Summit, pp. 1 – 5, Budapest, 
July 2007.  ISBN: 963-8111-66-6. DOI: 
10.1109/ISTMWC.2007.4299110 
[17] A. Mercurio, A. Di Giorgio, P. Cioci, “Open 
Source Implementation of Monitoring and 
Controlling Services for EMS/SCADA 
Systems by Means of Web Services,” IEEE 
Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 24, no. 3,  
pp. 1148-1153, 2009. DOI: 
10.1109/TPWRD.2008.2008461. 
[18] A. Di Giorgio A., L. Pimpinella, F. Liberati, “A 
model predictive control approach to the load 
shifting problem in a household equipped with 
an energy storage unit,” in 20st Mediterranean 
Conference on Control and Automation 
MED12, IEEE, pp. 1491 – 1498, Barcelona, 
ES, July 2012. DOI: 
10.1109/MED.2012.6265850. 
[19] V. Suraci, A. Marucci, R. Bedini, L. Zuccaro, 
A. Palo, “Energy-aware control of home 
networks,” in Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, pp. 299 – 311, vol. 7972, 2013. ISBN: 
978-364239642-7. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-
39643-4_23. 
[20] Common Criteria for Information Technology 
Security Evaluation, v3.1, July 2009. 
Available: www.commoncriteriaportal.org. 
[21] A. Di Giorgio, F. Liberati, “Interdependency 
modeling and analysis of critical infrastructures 
based on Dynamic Bayesian Networks,” in 19st 
Mediterranean Conference on Control and 
Automation MED11, IEEE, pp. 791–797, 
Corfu, GR, June 2011. DOI: 
10.1109/MED.2011.5983016. 
[22] P. Capodieci, S. Diblasi, E. Ciancamerla, M. 
Minichino, C. Foglietta, D. Lefevre, G. Oliva, 
S. Panzieri, R. Setola, S. De Porcellinis, F. 
Delli Priscoli, M. Castrucci, V. Suraci, L. Lev, 
Y. Shneck, D. Khadraoui, J. Aubert, S. 
Iassinovski, J. Jiang, P. Simoes, F. Caldeira, A. 
Spronska, C. Harpes, M. Aubigny, “Improving 
Resilience of Interdependent Critical 
Infrastructures via an On-Line Alerting 
System,” in Complexity in Engineering, 2010. 
COMPENG'10, p. 88 – 90, Rome, IT, Feb 
2010. ISBN: 978-1-4244-5982-7 
[23] F. Caldeira, M. Castrucci, M. Aubigny, D. 
Macone, E. Monteiro, F. Rente, P. Simoes, V. 
Suraci, “Secure Mediation Gateway 
Architecture Enabling the Communication 
Among Critical Infrastructures,” in 2010 
Future Network and Mobile Summit, pp. 1 – 9, 
Florence, IT, June 2010. ISBN: 978-1-905824-
16-8 
[24] ARTEMIS Strategic Research Agenda, March 
2006. Available: www.artemis-ia.eu 
[25] F. Delli Priscoli, A. Fiaschetti, V. Suraci, “The 
SHIELD Framework: how to control Security, 
Privacy and Dependability in Complex 
Systems,” in IEEE Workshop on Complexity in 
Engineering, pp. 1-4, Aachen, June 2012. DOI: 
10.1109/CompEng.2012.6242962 
[26] V. Suraci, A. Fiaschetti, G. Anzidei, "Design 
and implementation of a service discovery and 
composition framework for security, privacy 
and dependability control," in Future Network 
& Mobile Summit 2012, Berlin, DE, July 2012. 
[27] M. Castrucci, F. Delli Priscoli, A. Pietrabissa, 
V. Suraci, “A cognitive future internet 
architecture,” (2011) Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, pp. 91 – 102,  vol. 6656. 
ISBN: 978-364220897-3. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-
642-20898-0_7 
[28] Armen G. Bagdasaryan, "System Approach to 
Synthesis, Modeling and Control of Complex 
Dynamical Systems" in WSEAS Transactions 
on Systems and Control, Issue 2, Volume 4, 
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on SYSTEMS
Andrea Fiaschetti, Andrea Lanna, Martina Panfili 
Silvano Mignanti, Antonio Pietrabissa, Francesco Delli Priscoli 
Roberto Cusani, Gaetano Scarano, Andrea Morgagni
E-ISSN: 2224-2678 201 Volume 14, 2015
February 2009, ISSN: 1991-8763, E-ISSN: 
2224-2856 
[29] pSHIELD Technical Annex, June 2010. 
[30] nSHIELD Technical Annex, September 2011. 
[31] A. Fiaschetti, A. Morgagni, A. Lanna, M. 
Panfili, S. Mignanti, R. Cusani, G. Scarano, A. 
Pietrabissa F. Delli Priscoli “Control 
Architecture to Provide E2E security in 
Interconnected Systems: the (new) SHIELD 
Approach” in Proceedings Santorini ISBN 
978-1-61804-237-8 
[32]  A. Fiaschetti, V. Suraci, F. Delli Priscoli, A. 
Taglialatela, “Semantic technologies to model 
and control the “composability” of complex 
systems: a case study,” Book chapter of 
Horizons in Computer Science Research, Nova 
Publisher, 2012. 
[33] A. Fiaschetti, F. Lavorato, V. Suraci, A. Palo, 
A. Taglialatela, A. Morgagni, R. Baldelli, F. 
Flammini F., “On the use of semantic 
technologies to model and control security, 
privacy and dependability in complex 
systems,” in Computer Safety, Reliability, and 
Security, pp. 467 – 479, Springer,  2011. DOI: 
10.1007/978-3-642-24270-0_34. 
[34] F. Delli Priscoli, “A fully cognitive approach 
for future internet,” in Future Internet, vol. 2, 
no. 1, pp. 16–29, 2010.  
[35] F. Delli Priscoli, A. Pietrabissa, V. Suraci, M. 
Iannone, “Modelling Quality of Experience in 
Future Internet Networks,” in 2012 Future 
Network & Mobile Summit, pp. 1 – 9, Berlin, 
DE, 2012. ISBN: 9781467303200. 
[36]  OSSTMM, Open Source Security Testing 
Methodology Manual. Available: 
www.osstmm.org 
[37] S. Canale, A. Di Giorgio, A. Lanna, A. 
Mercurio, M. Panfili, and A. Pietrabissa, 
“Optimal planning and routing in medium 
voltage powerline communications networks,” 
in IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 
711–719, 2013. 
[38] Pratyusa K. Manadhata and Jeannette M. Wing 
“An Attack Surface Metric” in IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, 2010 
[39] Kirti Tyagi and Arun Sharma, "Reliability of 
Component Based Systems – A Critical 
Survey" in WSEAS Transactions on Computers, 
Issue 2, Volume 11, February 2012, E-ISSN: 
2224-2872 
[40] Hema M. S. and Chandramathi S., "Quality 
Aware Service Oriented Ontology Based Data 
Integration", in WSEAS Transactions on 
Computers, Issue 12, Volume 12, December 
2013, E-ISSN: 2224-2872 
[41] Zemliak A., Pena R. and Rios E., "Generalized 
Optimization Methodology for System Design" 
in WSEAS Transactions on Systems, Issue 6, 
Volume 9, June 2010, E-ISSN: 1109-2777 
[42] Kasem M. and Chahin N., “A Novel Approach 
for Meeting the Challenges of the Integrated 
Security Systems”, in WSEAS Transactions on 
Systems, Issue 9, Volume 10, September 2011, 
E-ISSN: 1109-2777 
[43] Cem B. and Kurtulan S., “Generalized State 
Equation for Petri Nets”, in WSEAS 
Transactions on Systems, Issue 9, Volume 10, 
September 2011, E-ISSN: 1109-277 
[44] nSHIELD Consortium, “Deliverable D5.2 
Preliminary Middleware and Overlay 
Prototypes”, in nSHIELD Project, 2012 
[45] nSHIELD Consortium, “Deliverable D2.8 Final 
nSHIELD Metrics”, in nSHIELD Project, 2013 
 
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on SYSTEMS
Andrea Fiaschetti, Andrea Lanna, Martina Panfili 
Silvano Mignanti, Antonio Pietrabissa, Francesco Delli Priscoli 
Roberto Cusani, Gaetano Scarano, Andrea Morgagni
E-ISSN: 2224-2678 202 Volume 14, 2015
